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I. Introduction
Like tourquoise dominos untoppled by either time or changes in the politi-
cal environment, the heart of the Brazilian state apparatus stands horizontally
aligned in neatly symetrical rows along the Esplanada dos Ministerios, Brasil-
ia's East-West axis. Viewed from the West, they form an impressive frame for
the spectacular architectural features of the Praca dos tres Poderes govern-
mental complex, and provide panoramic proof in concrete of the genius of urban
planning involved in the creation of the Brazilian capital. Nevertheless,
grandiose design and formidable appearance notwithstanding, it is not so much
the imutable architectural features of the state as it is the internal dynamics
at play with (and over) it that lie at the core of modern Brazil's political
history. In particular, the state apparatus offers an institutional manifesta-
tion of the character and orientation of the political regimes that have held
national power since 1960. With that in mind, this essay will attempt to
examine the internal architectonics at play within one state agency housed on
the Esplanada dos Ministerios: the Ministry of Labor.
The reason for this focus stems from the fact that Brazilian labor admini-
stration constitutes the main institutional bridge between the working classes
and the federal government. In this capacity, it has been one of—if not the
—
main vehicles for administering the interests and demands of the best organized
sectors of the Brazilian working classes. Hence, it is a branch of the state
where it is possible to evaluate the impact of regime change on public policy
and state organization in an important functional area. This is particularly so
in a case such as this, where there has recently occurred a transition from an
authoritarian to a (procedurally) democratic capitalist regime. Thus, while
its external edifice forms part of the enduring legacy and lofty aspirations of
the national project begun over a quarter century ago, the internal features of
the Brazilian Labor Ministry and its dependencies reflect the regime-conditioned
evolution of the national labor relations system during this period. As a
result, it presents an ideal window on the character, orientation, and struc-
tural bases that underlie the labor policies of the democratic regime installed
in 1985.
II. Historical Antecedents
Before 1918, there existed no institutional mechanism within the Brazilian
state that specifically administered the demands and interests of the working
classes (be they organized or not) . In 1919, responding to the emergence of new
syndical movements associated with waves of immigration from Southern Europe,
and yet reflecting the overall orientation of the economy at the time, a
National Department of Labor (NDL) was created within the Agriculture Ministry
2(Decree 3550/October 10, 1918). The NDL remained unchanged until 1930, when in
the wake of the Depression, Getulio Vargas—fully understanding the political
capital inherent in working class support and interested in promoting full scale
industrialization as part of a populist national project of Grandeza—incorpor-
ated the NDL into the newly-created Ministerio de Trabalho, Industria, e
Comercio (Ministry of Labor, Industry, and Commerce or MTIC) via decree
19,433/November 26, 1930. Formally organized by decree 19, 667/February 4, 1931,
the MTIC was to remain virtually unchanged for nearly thirty years. As such, it
became the centerpiece of a state corporatist system of interest group admin-
istration that has had few equals in Latin America in terms of both scope and
longevity (the Peronist state of 1946-1955 being the closest comparison in terms
of scope and the Mexican labor relations system being the closest in terms of
longevity), and which continues to be evident to this day.
Vargas' approach towards organized labor reflected his nationalist-populist
ideology and a keen sense of political opportunism. Capitalizing on the
economic crisis caused by the Depression, Vargas used the state-sponsored move
towards industrialization as a vehicle for cultivating the support of the
emerging urban industrial classes. With this in mind, he maintained that the
creation of the MTIC "constituted the first step towards organizing labor,
commerce, and industry throughout the country ... "with this gesture the Provi-
sional Government fulfills an honor debt that the public authorities" owed to
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Brazilian workers." With the advent of the Estado Novo in 1937, Vargas set
about reorganizing the state, the economy, and civil society on the basis of
functional representation, something that he believed would help overcome class
conflict, ensure social harmony, and thereby promote Brazil's emergence as a
world industrial power. Modeled after the Fascist constitutions then in force
in Portugal and Italy the Estado Novo sought to group all employeres and workers
in functionally-defined parallel organizations that were to eventually be
complemented by a similarly structured national legislature (which never
materialized). Hence, state corporatism was both an ideological objective and
a specific approach to policymaking and interest group administration under the
Vargas regime. Most importantly, while the ideological component of this
framework waned after 1945, its institutional features have survived virtually
intact to this day.
Even though the corporative structure of the Vargas-promoted labor codes
has been the subject of much discussion, it is worth reviewing several of its
enduring features. On an external plane, with respect to labor movement
activities and structure, several traits stand out. According to the legal
framework outlined by Estado Novo , the basic structure of interest group
representation consisted of "1st grade" organizations known as sindicatos
(unions), which respectively grouped together employers and workers in each
category/ trade, industry, and economic sector within a given municipality or
otherwise specified geographic area. One one sindicato was recognized as the
legitimate (and more importantly/ legal) representative of workers and employers
respectively engaged in given productive activities in each locality. Codified
as law in the Consolidacao das Leis do Trabalho (CLT), this framework also
provided that in states with five or more sindicatos either- worker or employer)
in a specific economic category, these could be incorporated into respective
"2nd grade" organizations known as federacoes (federations). In economic
categories with three or more such federations, they could be grouped together
in an umbrella "3rd grade" organization, the (sectoral) Confederacao (confedera-
tion) . The CLT originally provided for seven such types of confederation,
representing workers and employers in industry, commerce, land transport,
communications and publicity, water and air transportation, credit institutions,
educational and cultural institutions. In addition, a National Confederation
of Free Professions (lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc.) was provided for
(although for a long time only local sindicatos of such professions were
established, and it has only been recently that a confederation of these groups
has appeared) . The CLT did and currently does not provide for any national
confederation encompassing different functional categories, nor does it permit
direct links between different types of union. Moreover, public sector employ-
ees are formally barred from organizing under provisions of the CLT, and
heterogeneous (i.e. inter-sectoral) rural labor associations are actively
discouraged.
It is essential to note that the decentralizing and deconcentratng tenden-
cies promoted by the CLT form the legal basis for and external manifestation of
the exclusionary state corporatist structuring of working class interests,
something that may appear surprising in light of Vargas' populist ideology.
However/ inclusionary state corporatism is premised on the use of extensive
state inducements for sectoral cooperation coupled with a high degree of
organizational centralization and concentration within interest groups (the so-
called "verticalism" that underlies the formal pyramidal structure), as was the
case with the framework adopted by the Peronist regime of 1946-1955 in Argen-
Q
tina. Exclusionary state corporatism has an external approach characterized by
a decentralizing and deconcentrating orientation that is manifest in the
imposition of a wide array of legal constraints on sectoral activities and
organization, and which in this case is designed to structurally weaken the
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labor movement. Vargas complemented the enforced structural and organizational
weakness the CLT imposed upon the Brazilian labor movement by using techniques
of individual cooptation, heavily buttressed by corruption, in order to secure
the cooperation of labor leaders (as opposed to the rank and file as a whole).
He complemented this approach with the selective paternal bestowing of state-
provided public goods on compliant sectors of the urban working classes. This
approach was reaffirmed by legal provisions that accentuated the dependence of
labor leaders on the national labor authorities (for reasons that will be
discussed shortly). All of these measures had the effect of divorcing the labor
bureaucracy from the rank and file, thereby making them more amenable to
government initiatives (to say nothing of susceptible to outright political
manipulation) . To this was added discretionary enforcement of CLT provisions
regarding rights of association, whereby the government rigorously enforced
limitations on the organization and activities of the union movement while at
the same time adopting a more relaxed attitude towards the "less subversive"
activities of employer-producer groups (in an early variant of the "bi-frontal"
state corporatism O'Donnell has mentioned with respect to bureaucratic-authori-
tarian regimes). The point to be underscored is that from its inception the
orientation and structure of the modern Brazilian labor relations system was and
formally remains a fundamentally exclusionary framework that is premised on
state control over a structurally weak and divided labor movement. It is this
premise that is now being most seriously challenged by the process of democratic
consolidation
.
According to the framework currently outlined in the CLT, in order to
discharge basic functions such as collective bargaining, legal representation
before labor courts, grievance petitioning, etc., sindicatos have to previously
have been awarded official recognition by the Labor Ministry (articles 518-520).
Again, only one sindicato is granted legal status per functional category in
each locality (article 516). To be awarded recognition, sindicatos have to
agree to subordinate their professional concerns to the national interest and
cooperate with government authorities (article 518), plus refrain from political
activities (article 521). The Labor Ministry retains the authority to intervene
in unions (article 528), enforce their "normalization" (article 554), rescind
labor contracts (article 482), cancel collective bargaining or make it mandatory
(article 623), and more generally, supervise all wage negotiations (articles
611-615). To these provisions are added broad stipulations allowing the Labor
Ministry to regulate union statutes and oversee union finances and expenditures.
In the past, such constraints on union freedom did not end with the delimitation
of national labor. administration's powers and scope of authority. For example,
the constitution enacted under the Estado Novo outlawed all strikes as subver-
sive. Although this was partially modified during the democratic opening of
1946 (when strikes in "nonbasic" industries were authorized), broad legal
restrictions on the right to strike have prevailed ever since, (although in
recent years these restrictions have been haphazardly enforced)
.
In exchange for legal recognition, sindicatos receive sixty percent of a
state-mandated union tax ( imposto sindical , now referred to officially as the
"Contribucao sindical") equivalent to one day's pay per year for each worker
employed within a union's functional area or territorial jurisdiction (whether
the worker is affiliated with the union or not). Fifteen percent of the imposto
sindical is designated for the federation with which a union is affiliated; five
percent goes to the confederation to which the federation belongs. The remain-
ing twenty percent is designated for a Fondo Social Sindical (Union Social Fund,
now known as the Seguro de Desemprego or Unemployment Insurance Fund) admin-
istered by the Labor Ministry. This fund was originally designed to provide
benefits and services to non-union workers and the working population in
general. In practice it was used as an instrument of patronage and to defray
internal costs within national labor administration itself (a subject we will
return to later) . Moreover, union reliance on the imposto sindical removed
incentives to expand membership bases, since the monies received were not
derived from the number of union affiliates, but from the state itself. In any
case, if no sindicato exists in a particular functional area or territory, its
share of the imposto sindical goes to the respective state federation. If no
federation exists, both shares -go to the appropriate sectoral confederation. If
no confederation exists, the entire amount goes to the Fondo Social Sindical .
It should be evident that under this scheme, national labor administration has
traditionally had a vested financial interest in seeing that workers remained
unorganized in a broad array of activities.
Under the guidelines outlined in the CLT, funds derived from the imposto
sindical cannot be spent at the union's discretion. By law, these funds are to
be allotted to the provision of health, social security, and educational and
cultural services for the union membership. The Labor Ministry maintains
accounting procedures to see that this occurs. In practice, legal recognition
of unions has often hinged on whether they already have established benefit
programs for their members. Such provisions have forced unions to devote the
majority of their time and efforts towards membership support issues rather than
professional (i.e. economic or revindicative) concerns per se, which in any
event have been subjected to a wide range of state intervention mechanisms. All
of these regulations and procedures have traditionally allowed the Labor
Ministry to closely monitor and often manipulate union finances. This was (and
is) complemented by broad powers of supervision over union elections, including
the right to suspend or replace union officials and veto candidates for elective
positions (CLT articles 530-532).
As alluded to earlier, these restrictions have had a decided impact on the
labor leadership. Individual fortunes (both material and political) within the
labor hierarchy came to depend on the state's largesse and conformity with the
role played by each union leader. Moreover, cooperation with the labor authori-
ties often resulted in eventual incorporation into national labor administration
itself, with all the material and symbolic benefits said assession to public
office entailed. As a result, the officially-recognized unions became increas-
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ingly bureaucratized, government-supportive, and unresponsive to and effectively
divorced from their ostensible constituencies. There was, in effect, a top-down
organizational rationale in the Vargas labor codes that was designed to assure
the acquiescence of the rank and file to a union leadership responsive to
government dictates, and which effectively complemented the decentralizing and
deconcentrating organizational tendencies mentioned earlier. Even so, this
cooptive, bureaucratic, and top-down orientation gained many cooperative union
leaders the collective sobriquet of pelegos (lackeys), and established the
grounds for an eventual rank and file rejection of their positions. As a
result, the present conjecture finds remnants of the old labor bureaucracy (such
as long time pelego and current head of the moderate labor confederation CGT,
Joaquim dos Santos Andrade - "Joaquinzao" ) locked in a struggle with new
syndical leaders unbeholden to the corporatist system, and who were instrumental
in hastening the pace of the democratic transition process after 1978 (the most
notable being former metalworker Luis Inacio da Silva, "Lula," who is now leader
of the Partido dos Trabalhadores
,
(PT) and a federal representative from the
state of Sao Paulo) . This struggle between the new and old labor elites is most
visibly manifest in the competition between the most important labor confedera-
tions, the Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT), Confederacao General de
Trabalho (CGT), and Union Sindical Independiente (USD, for the position of
organized labor's national representative.
On an internal plane, within the state apparatus itself, another important
element of the Brazilian labor relations system that dates to the Vargas era is
the national network of labor courts. It is in these courts where most indivi-
dual and collective disputes, grievance procedures, and collective bargaining
are handled. This includes powers of dissidio collectivo, a form of compulsory
arbitration in all collective bargaining not previously resolved between the
parties or under the auspices of regional labor delegations representing the
Labor Ministry (which occurs in the majority of cases) . Formally part of the
federal judiciary, the labor court network includes local juntas de conciliacao
(conciliation boards)/ regional tribunals (tribunals), and the court of last
appeal, the Tribunal Superior do Trabalho (Superior Labor Tribunal or TST)
.
Beyond its arbitration and decisionary powers in specific areas of litigation,
this last agency also is ultimately responsible for determining the legal status
of all work stoppages (although it often delegates this responsibility to
regional labor tribunals), based on provisions in the Constitution and CLT.
Given the stakes involved (since workers engaged in strikes deemed to be illegal
can have their union intervened and be subjected to repression, imprisonment,
and/or dismissal from their jobs without legal recourse or material redress),
this makes the TST a critical actor in the national labor relations system.
From 1931 to 1946 the TST existed as the Conselho Superior do Trabalho
(CST), a quasi-administrative, quasi-judical dependency of the MTIC that also
had jurisdiction over the embryonic social security system. In 1946 its social
security responsibilities, by then expanded with the institution of a national
social security program, were transferred to the National Welfare Council
( Conselho Superior de Previdencia or CSP) . At that time the CST was renamed and
incorporated into the federal judicial system. Comprised of legal experts
(either lawyers or judges) and so-called "class" representatives of labor and
capital (again, most often lawyers), the TST formally became an independent part
of national labor administration, with no official organizational link to the
Labor Ministry. In practice, though, the TST has maintained close contacts with
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the labor authorities, and under different regimes has tended to reflect the
perspective prevailing within the Labor Ministry.
In contrast to the union structure promoted on the external plane, the
internal organization of national labor administration was initially highly
centralized. This is because under exclusionary state corporatism, the domi-
nance of control functions makes the state adopt the very organizational
features it actively discourages in excluded social groups. Hence, for thirty
years the entire labor relations system had as its core just two agencies, the
Departamento Nacional do Trabalho (National Labor Department or DNT) and the
Departamento Geral de Previdencia Social (Department-General of Social Welfare
or DGPS), both located in the MTIC. The DNT was responsible for recognizing
worker and employer organizations, initially mediating labor disputes (through
the regional labor delegations), enforcing labor legislation (including inter-
vention in unions), supervising union elections and finances, collecting labor
statistics, and overseeing the activities of regional labor delegates, which
besides the arbitration responsibilities mentioned above were also charged with
most workplace inspection and union control duties. In parallel, the DGPS
supervised the national social security system and individual union benefit
programs. This included accounting for the uses to which the imposto sindical
was directed in each case. With the activities of these two agencies, coupled
with the role of the labor courts, national labor administration covered the
full spectrum of union activities. It was in effect a "reverse image" of the
decentralized, deconcentrated union structures promoted at an external level.
Again, this concentration of authority and centralization of responsibilities
facilitated the control functions that were at the heart of the exclusionary
labor relations system. In fact, such organizational traits within the
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Brazilian state—centralization and concentration—not only were the internal
face of this particular exclusionary program: they are salient structural
characteristics of national labor administration in a wide range of Latin
American experiments with exclusionary state corporatist approaches to interest
group administration. In any event, this division of labor within national
labor administration was subsequently highlighted and codified by Law 3728 of
July 22, I960, which narrowed the scope and changed the title of the labor
portfolio to that of Ministerio de Trablaho e Previdencia Social (Ministry of
12
Labor and Social Welfare or MTPS).
Given its internal conformation and external attributes, it should be clear
from the time of the Estado Novo , the state—institutionally represented by
national labor administration—has occupied a superordinate position in the
Brazilian labor relations system. Given this fact/ unions have generally had to
conform to the requirements of the CLT or live a precarious , when not marginal
existence. This is not to say that unions have forsaken the latter option
entirely. To the contrary, as we shall see in Section III, as of the mid-1970s
an independent union movement rose to become a major socio-political actor,
following the less successful attempts of opposition unions in the 1950s and
1960s. However, the parallel existence of such independent or unofficial unions
along with the official union structure has also served to reinforce many of the
centrifugal tendencies of the national labor relations system, thereby reinforc-
ing its exclusionary character. That is to say, the decentralizing and decon-
centrating tendencies promoted within the labor movement by the CLT have
actually been strengthened, rather than weakened by the appearance of these new
independent actors. Hence, only a major revision of the CLT in light of the new
12
democratic realities will allow the labor movement to consolidate its organiza-
tional bases.
Returning to the original design, it should be noted that Vargas was astute
enough to provide labor with many state-provided benefits that otherwise would
have been the subject of union bargaining strategies. This gave an inclusionary
patina to the labor relations system that helped disguise its exclusionary
bases. Thus, as a form of compensation for the loss of union autonomy and legal
restrictions on union freedom of action (as well as to reaffirm his benevolent
impage in the eyes of the working classes), Vargas instituted a series of
measures that obviated many union functions. Among these, he enacted programs
that regulated professional training programs and created employment cards for
all workers. He also passed a Lei de Estabilidade (Employment Security Law)
which regulated the terms and compensation for dismissal from employment (which
was subsequently modified and considerably reduced by the military regime
installed in 1964), and in 1941 enacted the first minimum wage legislation to
appear in Brazil. In another first, he created a nation-wide social security
network that provided health protection and retirement pensions to the working
population organized within the official union structure, and which became the
primary responsibility of the DGPS . It was therefore the populist state, not
the unions, which provided the organized working classes with the first signifi-
cant advances in terms of welfare benefits and worker's rights, something that
served to reinforce the effective marginalization of organized labor as an
independent collective agent and political actor. It is here where the seeming
dichotomy between the inclusionary and exclusionary features of this design
becomes most transparent.
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All of these measures also had the effect of strengthening the comptroller
and previsionary responsibilities of national labor administration. Such state
paternalism complemented, and in many cases superceded, the well-established
tradition of employer paternalism that had characterized Brazilian labor-
management relations before the Estado Novo , and which many argue persists to a
significant degree in some sectors to this day. This has had the effect of
making the Brazilian working classes completely dependent on external actors
—
either the state or employers—for the definition and promotion of their rights,
rather than on themselves and their collective agents. This lack of self-
recognized enpowerraent among the rank and file has been a major impediment to
labor movement consolidation, since it entails overcoming a form of worker
socialization that has long historical roots. In any case, as of the Estado
Novo , where the state is silent on the issue of worker's collective and indivi-
dual rights they have had little recourse, and can find themselves subject to
the arbitrary depredations of employers who consider themselves absolved of
major responsibility for their employee's rights and general well-being.
Conversely, this has made labor administration an excellent vehicle for culti-
vating working class support for individual political ambitions. One example is
provided by Vargas' Labor Minister from 1950 to 1954, Joao Goulart, who used his
position to establish the bases for his subsequently successful campaign for the
presidency in 1960.
In effect, in the words of one early observer, the structure created by
Getulio Vargas during the Estado Novo "wove a tight net of governmental control
over worker and (to a lesser extent) employer organizations..." More specif-
ically, it "...resulted in the Ministry of Labor developing into one of the most
powerful institutions of the administration. It was given extensive control
14
over the trade union movement and the employer's associations established under
the CLT as well as over the process of settling disputes between workers and
employers. It was also given extensive powers over the enforcement of labor
laws... The ultimate goal of the CLT was for all workers and employers to be
grouped in one section or another of the structure built on the basis of the
CLT." ' As a result, "although labor-management relations have evolved consid-
erably since the end of the Estado Novo , they still remain very much under its
shadow. The Vargas regime, though it made the unions financially strong, made
them organizationally weak, and subject to the dictates of the Ministry of
Labor... State paternalism established under the Estado Novo was still the most
important feature of labor-management relations in Brazil more than a decade
14
after the official end of the Vargas corporate state." In fact, state domi-
nance over the labor relations system was subsequently reinforced, often in a
highly coercive fashion, by the military bureaucratic regime installed in 1964.
A less dispassionate view maintains that this negative corporatist legacy
continues at present, and that "the existing powers of recognition, cessation,
and intervention awarded by law to the state, as well as the mandatory union
affiliation, must be identified as totalitarian instruments." Totalitarian or
not, it is also evident that despite episodic periods of relaxation and the
varying degrees of actual state control exercised at specific points in time as
a result of dissimilar regime projects in the field of labor relations, union
freedoms as such has never completely existed in modern Brazil. Instead, when
it comes to labor relations, since the 1930s all issues of importance have been
raised, addressed, and resolved within the sphere of national labor administra-
tion, no matter what its specific orientation at different points in time. This
1 fi
is seen as a major obstacle to both union and political democracy.
15
These exclusionary state corporatist traits were reaffirmed and strengthen-
ed after the coup d* etat of 1964, to which was added, on an external plane, a
strong dose of labor repression that was coupled, on an internal plane, with a
technocratic orientation within the newly-installed state hierarchy. One
significant effect of the new orientation was the separation of labor and
welfare concerns within the national state apparatus. In 1967 the Instituto
Nacional de Previdencia Social (National Social Welfare Institute or INPS) was
created as the lead agency in the national health and welfare system, thereby
removing most social security and welfare concerns from the purview of national
labor administration. This was confirmed in 1970, when the functional responsi-
bilities of the labor portfolio were again narrowed and it was renamed the
Ministerio do Trabalho (Ministry of Labor or MTb) . In 1974, a Ministerio de
Previdencia e Asistencia Social (Ministry of Welfare and Social Assistance or
MPAS) was created to assume direction of the national welfare network, with the
INPS passing under its control. Similarly, a Ministerio de Saude (Health




Along with the narrowing of its scope of authority, another important
change in labor administration's orientation under the military regime was the
reassertion of its powers of intervention. After 1964 said powers were vigor-
ously applied, and hundreds of unions were intervened in order to "normalize"
their activities (which were deemed to have become excessively political and in
some cases downright subversive in the more relaxed atmosphere prevalent under
the Goulart administration)
. As a complement to the full-scale intervention of
unions, strike activity was—at least until 1978—systematically and often
severely curtailed.
16
The orientation of national labor administration began to change as part of
the process of political opening or abertura initiated in 1974, and lead to a
significant reorganization of the MTb in 1978. This reorganization can be
perceived as an organizational reflection within the state apparatus of the
abertura process, since it was designed to structurally adjust the state in
order for it to better address the changing syndical realities brought about by
the process of political liberalization. Authorized by decree 81,663 of May 16,
1978, the new structure and functions of national labor administration subse-
quently became the organizational framework inherited by the democratic regime
1 8installed in 1985. In fact, it can be argued that the reforms of 1978 had the
potential (possibly unintended) effect of easing the process of democratic
transition and consolidation at the institutional level, since no comprehensive
organizational reforms had to be made by the democratic authorities in order to
adapt the state apparatus to the new realities of an "open" society. With such
structural reforms already in place, the change of regime immediately moved to
the level of external policy formulation rather than the otherwise preliminary
level of internal reorganization (since it is generally recognized that the
translation of policy into practice requires an organizational capacity to do
19
so)
. Whatever the ultimate intention, the organizational reforms promoted
within the MTb and associated agencies in 1978 formed part of a process of
organizational change and adaptation on the part of the Brazilian state that was
tied to the military regime's program of political liberalization, which was
characterized by a gradual, controlled process of distencao (distension),
descomprenssao (decompression) and eventual abertura. Within national labor
administration, the reforms of 1978 specifically responded to the changing
character of the Brazilian labor market, and of labor relations in general, that
17
became increasingly manifest as of the mid-1970 's. These changes were in turn
the combined product of political factors (such as the exhaustion of the
original authoritarian project/ rise of dissident factions within ertswhile
supporters of the regime/ particularly the industrial bourgeoisie/ the growth of
independent sectors in the union movement, the emergence of new interest groups
such as environmentalists and feminists, and the need for the armed forces to
20
restore professional distance from government) / as well as transformations in
both the international and Brazilian economies (such as technological change,
increased complexity and diversification of the international and national
division of labor, greater integration of the domestic and international
markets, the adverse impact of the global recession of the late 1970s, the
emergence of the global debt crisis in the ensuring decade, etc.). By respond-
ing to such changing circumstances with a program of policy reorientation and
organizational reform, the outgoing authoritarian regime displayed an adaptive
capacity and somewhat altruistic long-term perspective that differed markedly
21from the practices of other military regimes in the Southern Cone.
For the moment we should dwell on the fact that these reforms notwithstand-
ing, the formal external attributes of national labor administration have not
undergone similarly significant modifications with respect to the original
design, and consequently remain as an enduring authoritarian legacy which must
22be confronted as part of the democratic consolidation process. As we shall
see, this involves government acts of commission and omission with respect to
the formal external attributes of national labor administration, because unlesse
these powers are modified (rather than simply ignored) they will continue to
prove an inviting mechanism for imposing unilateral solutions on labor-capital
conflicts, rather than encourage the search for negotiated solutions that are an
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essential part of the (admittedly laborious) process of democratic labor
relations. In other words, whether or not they become letra morta under the
present regime, such unmodified external attributes awarded to the state
continue to be an enduring legacy of an authoritarian-inspired labor project
long overcome by the course of history. A fundamental change of government
attitude towards the national labor relations system is consequently required,
plus the will to impose this change. Hence, the shift to democratic labor
practices should be concretely reflected in the reformulation of the state's
overall role and specific functions within the national labor relations system.
As we shall see, this has become a major dilemma for the Sarnay administration.
In summarizing the historical antecedents to the present conjecture, it is
important to understand that Brazilian labor administration has exhibited a high
level of institutional continuity throughout its first fifty years, especially
with regard to its external attributes (scope of authority and legal responsi-
bilities) . This has promoted a form of bureaucratic inertia that is extremely
resistant to a modification of its external role (despite the recent structural
changes), particularly when these changes are designed to reduce and otherwise
limit the prerogatives awarded the state in the field of labor relations. It is
therefore not surprising that, beyond different regime rationales for maintain-
ing such a system, the exclusionary state corporatist structuring of working
class interests has remained as a distinctive, enduring, and quite dynamic traco
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estrutural of Brazilian labor administration. It is only now, with the advent
of the new democratic regime, that the popular belief that nada muda in the
federal bureaucracy can be properly tested, since its very consolidation depends
upon the extent to which labor is incorporated rather than excluded from the
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political process , and hence on the role and organizational changes within the
state apparatus that will facilitate said incorporation.
III. The External Face of Brazilian Administration: Labor Policy and Redemocra-
tization, 1985-1987 .
"Our government, mine and that of the workers, from the beginning made use
of the social option and granted priority to the poor. Workers began to
participate in decisions. Never have we heard so much in favor of those who
work. Not only in the laws passed and actions of the government, but also in
our conduct. . .participation, dialogue, and cordiality characterize the relations
24between the government and the working classes." With statements like this
May Day address of 1986, the democratic government led by Jose Sarnay has
professed to be fundamentally concerned with promoting the welfare of the
Brazilian working classes as part of a larger project that is ostensibly
designed to promote the autonomous and equitable incorporation of socio-economic
class interests in the process of democratic consolidation. To do so, the
external facet of the government's labor program has been characterized by a
three-tiered approach that is evident, as the President said, in the laws
proposed, the political and economic measures adopted, and in the conduct of
national labor administration since April 1985.
At the broadest level of operation, the government has reaffirmed the need
to establish some form of equitable and regularized "dialogue" between labor,
capital, and the state that would eventually culminate in the achievement of a
formal, concertative "social pact." This was an oft-enunciated ambition of the
late Tancredo Neves, and is envisioned as a means of altering the confronta-
tional mode of discourse that has traditionally prevailed between organized
20
labor and capital in Brazil. To encourage labor participation in such a
dialogue, the government has recognized the legitimacy of multi-sectoral central
labor confederations (CGT, CUT, USI) as articulators of working class interests,
this despite the lack of legal criteria on which to base such recognition (since
the CLT expressly prohibits such organizations). For the first time in Brazil-
ian history, the government has invited all of the major labor confederations
(both national and sectoral) to participate in tripartite and bipartite dia-
logues, and has encouraged a wide array of similar meetings at the state and
local levels. In late 1986 and early 1987 the first national tripartite
meetings were held in Brasilia. These first attempts at tripartite discussion,
chaired by Minister of Labor Almir Pazzianotto, were boycotted by the CUT and
eventually collapsed in January 1987 after the government refused to agree to
labor demands that it suspend all foreign debt payments. This was exacerbated
by an economic climate in which producers withheld from market basic goods in
order to circumvent (and subvert) price freezes announced by the March, 1986
Piano Cruzado economic stabilization program. The widespread use of egotistical
sectoral strategies of this sort let to whole-scale primary good shortages.
These shortages and the emergence of other market pathologies (proliferation of
black markets, profiteering, hoarding, etc.), all of which became particularly
acute towards the end of 1986 and beginning of 1987, made clear to organized
labor that
—
government-sponsored talks notwithstanding--Brazilian capitalists
were not disposed to cooperate with the economic stabilization program, nor was
the democratic government capable of enforcing producer compliance with the
provisions of that program. Hence, organized labor considered that it was
placed in the position of having to unilaterally shoulder the burden of sacri-
fice imposed by the Piano Cruzado (by accepting government-imposed wage re-
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straint) while simultaneously cooperating in a fruitless tripartite discussion
that lacked substantive terms. Faced with this scenario, labor abandoned the
concertative forum and returned to the traditional strategies of sectoral
confrontation. This was immediately manifested in a wave of strikes and slow-
downs in a variety of sectors during the first quarter of 1987.
Rather than accept a return to the politics of confrontation (which, given
the powers awarded it by the CLT, would have been easier to do) , the government
responded to this initial failure to establish some concertative consensus by
subsequently holding a series of bipartite conferences involving the president
and leading representatives of capital and labor. Scheduled two weeks apart in
late March and early April 1987, the initial partite talks were designed to
encourage the exchange of sectoral ideas and concerns with government proposals
.
Hence, the meetings between the president and organized labor (April 4) included
representatives of all the major labor confederations (including the CUT), and
responded "to a plea from the unionists themselves and the claim made by various
sectors, during the debates over the social pact, that only the President could
25bring closer the conflicting interests of labor and capital." In effect,
these talks were designed to reaffirm the mediatory role of the executive branch
by allowing it to consider the full range of sectoral concerns individually,
then outline the agenda for future tripartite discussion.
Although little in the way of substantive agreements were reached during
the April 4 meeting, some initial steps were taken towards establishing a basis
for cooperation. In principle, the president agreed to include labor represen-
tatives in the formulation of economic policy. This included establishing a
tripartite mechanism for determining the inflation index and corresponding wage
readjustment scales (with labor and capital both represented by DIEESE—the
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Departamento Intersindical de Estatistica e Estudos Socio-Economicos—which has
a strong reputation for providing reliable and objective economic analyses),
along with labor representation in the Conselho Monetario Nacional (National
Monetary Council), in the directorates of Lloyd Maritimo Brasileiro (the
national shipping line) other public enterprises such as SUDAM, SUDENE, and
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IBGE, and a host of state and municipal agencies.
Officials of the Labor Ministry argue that the public sectoral meetings and
regular private discussions hosted by the MTb are in fact a means by which
labor, capital, and the state can begin to establish an ongoing sectoral
dialogue based on trust and mutual understanding of each other's positions.
With that first step accomplished, these officials "believe in a negotiated
27
solution" to the current impasse. These meetings are viewed by the government
as preconditions to authentic concertation and the formal establishment of a
social pact. As such, they can be understood as procedural-formulaic and
symbolic rather than substantive discussions which are primarily designed to
highlight the legitimate role played by organized labor as a socio-economic and
political actor, then lay the framework in which concertative discussions of a
more pragmatic-substantive nature can occur. Even so, the lengthy and abstract
nature of these discussions has left major sectors of the union movement
dissatisfied. The CUT, for example, sees them as more of a diversionary tactic
rather than a sincere effort to establish bases for labor incorporation into the
democratic consolidation process. According to Jair Meneguelli, President of
the CUT, "from the president and his advisors we have only received a commitment
to further dialogue, but without any solution to our wage and social revindica-
28
tions." The CGT, on the other hand, has adopted a more practical (and perhaps
opportunistic) approach, and has not discounted the utility of the discussions.
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This has allowed the government to persist in its attempts to utilize concerta-
tive forums in the effort to find negotiated solutions to sectoral differences.
It is quite clear , though, that in the pursuit of labor incorporation in
the democratic consolidation process/ talk is not enough. The government
certainly is cognizant of this fact. For that reason, it has simultaneously
operated on two other levels that provide far less abstract guides to the
current thrust of labor policy.
The most important of these is constituted by the combined legal-economic-
political level of operation, in which measures are being promoted in all three
spheres that are oriented towards advancing the interests of the working classes
while at the same time humanizing the national productive process. At a legal
level, the core of the government's strategy rests on the labor legislation
package outlined in the Projeto de Lei 9,059/1986, which was submitted to
Congress in July of 1986. To this has been added a clause proposing ratifica-
tion of International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention N.87, which guarantees
freedom of association for all workers. Scheduled to be voted upon by Congress
before the Congreso Constituente (Constituent Convention) in November, 1987, the
proposed reforms intend to dramatically modify three key elements of current
Brazilian labor legislation: the right to strike, collective bargaining, and
freedom of voluntary association without state interference.
With regard to the right to strike, the government has proposed to make the
law more flexible, narrowing the number of "essential" industries in which work
stoppages are prohibited, permitting certain types of public employee strikes,
eliminating provisions by which the state must be notified in advance of any
meeting in which a strike vote is to be taken, and modifying the regulations
governing the taking of such votes. In addition, penalties against illegal
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strikes in essential services are to be reduced considerably (for example,
29imprisonment for merely engaging in such strikes would be abolished). Thus,
while it does not guarantee an unqualified right to strike, the government's
proposal does broaden the range of admissible strike activities.
In terms of collective bargaining, the proposed legislation attempts to
promote autonomous wage negotiations at the lowest level possible, removing
mandatory state arbitration and ratification of collective bargains. Under the
new legislation, labor and capital would no longer need state sanction in order
to formalize collective bargaining agreements, and could choose their arbitrat-
ors, which is believed to east the way for conciliation. Procedural matters
(time of response to an offer, counteroffer requirements, etc.) are also
clarified, pared down, and temporally delimited. Wage negotiations could thus
involve sindicatos , federacSes , or confederacoes independently or together,
depending on the organization and degree of vertical integration of each
30
sector.
As for the proposed rights of association, the government is attempting to
secure congressional ratification or ILO Convention N. 87, which is an inter-
nationally recognized standard that guarantees basic rights of freedom of
association. Accordingly, Article 2 of the Ministry of Labor-formulated decree
proposing ratification states that "workers and employers, without any type of
distinction, shall have the right to create, without prior authorization,
organizations of their choice, as well as have the right to join those organiza-
tions, with the sole condition being that they comply with the statutes of
each." However, because of its scope, ratification of Convention N.87 entails
a complete re-writing of Chapter 5 of the CLT (on collective bargaining) and is
therefore the subject of much congressional debate and delay. As a compromise,
25
the government proposes that the existing labor federations and confederations
be maintained, albeit with a more heterogeneous base. Where more than one union
represents a functional area of activity, joint commissions would be established
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for wage negotiations, strike decisions, and other pertinent concerns. This
would not require as much re-writing of the CLT as the direct transposing of ILO
Convention N.87 would entail. More importantly, it would provide the legal
foundations for a move from the exclusionary state corporatist labor relations
system to some form of European-style inclusionary neo-corporatist framework
that if not ensuring a monopoly of representation, would maintain centralized
and consolidated national peak associations while making them and their affili-
ated unions more representative of the rank and file.
The government believes that these legislative reforms will "democratize
labor-capital relations in Brazil, modernize relations of production, and put an
end to the corporatist structure of the CCT." In proposing these changes, the
government hopes to overcome a tendency by which "all governments, since 1937,
have preferred to preserve state powers of intervention and state paternalism as
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a basis of support for the union apparatus." If this legislation is approved,
national labor administration would formally assume a neutral role that in-
creases the autonomy of unions while enhancing the state's mediatory functions.
The effort to remove the "vicio paternalista" (paternalist vice) has led labor
authorities to be accused by some business sectors of a pro-labor bias, although
their self-perception is more that of neutral modernizers and technicians
34attempting to implement the tripartite philosophy and dictates of the I.L.O.
It should be clarified that the labor movement is not entirely enthused
with the proposed legislative reforms, especially with the effort to ratify ILO
Convention 87. The CUT generally supports the proposed reforms, although it
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continues to find the proposed strike laws overly restrictive. The CGT and USI,
however, are vehemently opposed to ratification of ILO Convention 87. This is
due to the fact that if approved, such legislation foresees the gradual elimina-
tion over five years of the state mandated imposto sindical , which many unions,
especially the "official" and most smaller ones, consider the major source of
their patrimony as well as the means by which they provide social services to
their members (which continues to be their main function) . Opponents of the
move to ratify ILO Convention 87 consequently argue that, with the extinction of
smaller unions, there will be an "elitization" of the labor movement under
larger and wealthier unions. In addition, the leaders of the CGT and USI are
concerned that the centralizing and concentrating trends promoted in the union
movement by the elimination of the imposto sindical would in turn result in the
elimination of their respective confederations, which are already losing
membership ground to the CUT. Hence there is a logic of mutual self-preserva-
tion at play that fuels the resistance to ILO Convention 87 on the part of some
sectors of the labor movement.
On the other hand, proponents of the legislative reforms believe that the
elimination of the imposto sindical will make union leaders more responsive to
the rank and file, as well as encourage recruitment (since union treasuries
would become entirely dependent upon membership contributions). With just 17%
of the Brazilian workforce organized, this leaves much room for expansion.
Moreover, this view considers a heterogeneous, vertically unified and central-
ized labor movement to be an asset rather than a liability, especially if its
membership bases are expanded and it is made more representative of and respon-
sive to rank and file interests. Under such a structure, the working classes
could institutionally speak with one unified voice. This would significantly
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alter the terms of the strategic interaction labor engages with both the state
and capital.
At a political level, the government is actively engaged in drafting a new
constitution, and the Congreso Constituente is in the process of deliberating
the proposed new charter. Included in the Anteprojecto da Constitucao drafted
by the Comissao de Estudos Constitucionals are general provisions promoting
basic rights of association (Title 1, Articles 23, 28, 32), and the right to
strike (Title 1, Article 33 and Title 5, Chapter 1, Article 4). In addition,
there are specific clauses outlining the Direitos dos Trabalhadores (Title 5,
Chapter 1), that is, the rights of all workers organized or not. These include
safe working conditions, a fair wage, eight hour work days (in a country in
which 29.3% of the economically active population currently works more than
eight hours daily without overtime pay) , employment stability, paid holiday,
maternity, and sick leave, worker participation in business directorates,
employer-provided child care, free and voluntary affiliation with unions of
choice, and prohibitions on union intervention by the state. This is comple-
mented by similarly detailed rights to social security benefits (Title 5,
Chapter 2), and a series of clauses designed to improve the general welfare of
the least-advantaged sectors in society via programs of public education,
health, and environmental protection (Title 5, Chapters 5-7; Title 6, Chapter 1;
Title 7, Chapters 1-2).
It remains to be seen if the Congreso Constituente ratifies the full range
of the proposed constitutional reforms in the area of labor relations and
workers rights. While the labor unions and labor-based parties have presented
petitions with over 300,000 signatures supporting these reforms, one can assume
that employer group and conservative sector opposition to such sweeping changes
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will force the adoption of more limited, second-best proposals in order to reach
an enforceable compromise. However, it should be noted that there are some
encouraging signs in this regard. For one thing, there are several labor-based
parties represented in the Constituente, including the Partido dos Trabalhadores
(PT), Partido Democratico Trabalhista (PDT), Partido Trabalhista do Brasil
(PTB), Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCB), Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB)
,
plus the left-wing of the dominant party, the PMDB (who are collectively known
as the "Grupo Autentico"). In fact, the rise of the PT as the main political
spokesman for organized labor is viewed as conducive to labor participation in
tripartite vehicles, since political issues can be separated and channeled
through the PT at the Congressional level, thereby leaving the executive branch
and collective agents of capital and labor free to concentrate on economic and
social issues in concertative forums. Obviously the PT will also have a role to
play in the concertative process (although that has yet to be precisely de-
fined) , since the links between the CUT and the PT are extremely strong. The
point is that the emergence of a representative labor party at the national
level is seen as conducive to the formulation of concertative strategies, and
more generally, to labor incorporation in the democratic consolidation process.
This emphasis on parallel institutional representation for labor as a basis for
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regime stability harks to postwar European experiences with social pacts.
Even so, it is clear that legal and political guarantees are of little
consequence if the working population continues to be the victim of economic
exploitation, deprivation, and exclusion, to say nothing of the generalized
climate of profound economic crisis. With that in mind, the government has
adopted a series of economic measures that, if of limited degrees of success,
have shown its apparent desire for labor incorporation at this level as well.
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A major step was the decision to suspend interest payments on the foreign
debt, which now totals some 107 billion dollars. According to Minister of Labor
Pazzianotto, rather than a populist gesture, this was done because free of the
burden of such payments, resources could be directed towards the pursuit of
increased investment and accelerated economic growth, which the government
believes to be the best means of ensuring improved wage rates. Hence, "the
suspension of interest payments on the external debt to international private
37
banks make possible salary growth." Another major step that preceded the
interest payment suspension was the adoption of the Piano Cruzado economic
stabilization program announced on March 11, 1986. Now well into its third
phase (the Novo Piano Cruzado or "Piano Bresser" announced on June 12, 1987),
and beyond the debate over its initial success and subsequent failures, two
elements of the program that are pertinent to labor concerns are worth noting.
First, the effort to impose price freezes on domestic staples. Although the
response of producers was, as mentioned earlier, pathologically egotistical, the
attempt to freeze the price of such goods was a clear indication that the
government did not wish to pass the entire burden of sacrifice imposed by the
austerity measures required for economic stabilization onto the working classes.
The other, complementary measure was the imposition of the famous gatilho
salarial ("wage trigger") for all wage labor and fixed incomes (including
minimum wage and social security payments) . The gatilho was designed to
"disparar" (fire) whenever the inflation rate exceeded twenty percent. Accord-
ing to Secretaria de Empregos e Salarios (Secretary of Employment and Salaries)
Dorothea Werneck, "salaries must also retain their purchasing power," and thus
"the trigger better protects purchasing power in the face of low inflation
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rates." Hence, if the price freezes had been respected and inflation had been
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slowed, the gatilho would have served as a viable catch-up mechanism that helped
preserve the value of the real wage. As it is, practice proved different, and
the rate of inflation increased nearly twenty percent per month in the first
quarter of 1987. Between the time taken to determine the inflation index and
that involved in issuing the readjustment order, it was six weeks to two months
between each "disparo" of the gatilho salarial . Moreover, the gatilho was not
retroactive. Hence, the value of real wages continued to drop despite the
attempts to regularly readjust them. One reliable non-government source
(DIEESE) has calculated the average real wage loss at over 40% since the
original Piano Cruzado was announced, with a 38% subsequent loss in average real
wage following the implementation of the Novo Piano Cruzado. Similarly, the
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minimum wage fell to its lowest level in 37 years. As a result, the gatilho
at best served as a partial ameliorative mechanism that could not fully compen-
sate for the loss of purchasing power provoked by supply-side inflation. Labor
economists responded by suggesting modifications to the gatilho so that it would
40be trimesterly indexed at the cumulative rate of inflation. However, under
the Novo Piano Cruzado a new round of price freezes has been coupled with the
elimination of the gatilho (possibly at the behest of employers and reportedly
over Minister Pazzianotto' s objection). Instead, the government now proposes to
begin a series of six month wage adjustments after the first 90-day period of
price freezes concludes. Labor's response has been to denounce the elimination
of the gatilho , demand an average 100% real wage adjustment for all sectors, and
announce a return to the "battle stations" as part of a strategy of renewed





Organized labor argues that the fall in real wages, coupled with the
elimination of subsidies for certain sectors of agriculture, cut-backs in
government services, and increases in public utility and transportation rates
(which have recently sparked a wave of violent demonstrations), constitute a
plan to reduce domestic demand in accordance with IMF-imposed requirements. It
thus views the Piano Cruzado as a fundamentally unequal program that disporpor-
tionally imposes sacrifices on those who are least able to afford them.
It is worth stressing the point that the government (or at least those
engaged in labor administration) and organized labor agree on one thing: salary
increases are not the root cause of inflation. The government has consequently
tried to portray itself as the defender of the real wage in a very hostile
environment, and has consistently opposed the wage ceilings advocated by
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capital. In fact, despite its lack of success, according to Labor Minister
Pazzianotto, the government has attempted to both "avoid inflationary corrosion
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and award a real wage increase." To this effect, Secretary of Labor Plmio
Sarti stated that the Labor Ministry "considers accurate DIEESE's studies which
44indicate that salaries constitute only 10 percent of business costs."
Secretary of Employment and Salaries Wernek has been even more blunt in formu-
lating this view, saying that she "does not consider wage increases as a cause
of inf lation. . . the biggest pressures come from price increases that attempt to
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maintain a determined margin of profit..." It should therefore be apparent
that, although it has failed to protect the real wage in the manner envisioned,
the price and wage provisions of the economic stabilization programs have been
part of an as of yet unsuccessful government effort to protect a measure of real
wage purchasing power during the period of economic crisis.
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Other complementary measures have been oriented towards the general welfare
of the working population. In 1986 the government created the first comprehen-
sive national unemployment compensation scheme, the seguro desemprego (as part
of the original Piano Cruzado) , which is in part paid by the imposto sindical
(in a change of fiscal policy that has significant implications for the internal
financing of the Labor Ministry, as we shall discuss in Part IV). Besides
addressing basic issues of social justice, it is believed that the seguro
desemprego has a positive effect on aggregate demand, labor market conditions,
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and employer investment strategies. A job creation program has also been
established, using public sector financing, that provided 970,000 jobs in
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1986. According to Labor Secretary Sarti, beyond maintaining wage levels, it
has been the generation of employment rather than avoiding strikes that has been
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the main concern of the labor authorities. However, the increasing levels of
unemployment generated by the economic crisis have also hindered the success of
the government job creation program. At best, then, it can be viewed as yet
another partial compensatory device in the face of adverse economic conditions.
In addition, besides receiving the regular increases allowed by the gatilho
salarial , the minimum wage could eventually benefit from an innovative govern-
ment reform first proposed by officials of national labor administration.
According to Labor Minister Pazzianotto, under the proposal all future wage
adjustments will use the dollar as a "reference base" and the minimum wage will
be increased so as to eventually reach the monthly equivalent of 120 dollars (it
49is currently roughly equivalent to 60 dollars per month). The idea, of
course, is to maintain the real value of the minimum wage by tying it to a fixed
value in stable currency which is both fair and yet competitive with other
national wage scales (for example, the minimum wage in Colombia is also roughly
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equivalent to 120 dollars per month) . To the proposed minimum wage reforms can
be added a major overhaul of the national social security system that is
designed to extract less from and deliver more benefits to the least advantaged
classes, including the unemployed, pensioners, and single parent families. This
includes raising employer contributions as a percentage of the tripartite
(employer, employee, state) contribution to social security, increasing federal
support for state welfare programs, and implementing benefit readjustments tied
to the rate of inflation (which resulted in monthly increases of 19-49% in the
last half of 1986 and first quarter of 1987.
In fact, despite its relative lack of success to date, there has been a
major effort to restructure the provision of basic public goods such as social
welfare and public health services since the democratic regime was installed.
That is, "with the country's redemocratization in 1985, different and profound
politico-administrative measures were adopted in order to moralize and modernize
collection and accounting systems, to increase the participation and social
control of organized representatives of both employers and employees in the
system, and to systematize and increase the administrative and managerial
efficiency of the network's agencies."
This overhaul, which was actually begun shortly before the assumption of
the new regime, included the creation of an executive council charged with
restructuring national health services, integrating the activities of the
ministries of Health, Social Welfare, and Education with each other as well as
with state and municipal agencies, and overseeing the creation and implementa-
tion of Integrated Health Plans (Acoes Integradas de Saude or AIS) which are
designed to ensure effective federal control over and local integration into the
national public health system. This has resulted in a 6.4% increase in federal
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funds allocated for public health through the end of the decade, the signing of
numerous conventions with state and municipal agencies which increased the
numbers of participating agencies from 132 at the end of 1984 to 644 by the end
of 1985, and which has extended the range of potential patient coverage to 70%
of the population. As a result, patient admissions to public hospitals and
clinics increased 18.07% during the same period, and was paralleled by a 15.56%
increase in federally-supported university hospital admissions. However, all of
this progress notwithstanding, it remains clear that the government's initia-
tives in this area have failed to meet the social and political expectations
generated along with the return to democracy in Brazil, since they continue to
fall short of providing for the basic needs of a large fraction of the popula-
tion. That is to say, the new social perspectives generated in the population
by the process of redemocratization broached the possibility of new horizons for
health and welfare based on notions of fairness, egalitarianism, and basic human
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rights, and yet at present continue to be very much a delayed promise. To
this can be added the continued frustrations encountered by the government when
implementing these and other reforms such as its originally ambitious land
redistribution program. Like other reform packages, the latter has been
subverted by land owner resistance (including murder, intimidation, and bribery
of officials representing both the government and landless peasants), and
therefore also continues to be much of a delayed promise and frustrated hope.
Not surprisingly, in response there has been a wave of land take-overs and
illegal squatting that has fueled the cycle of violence and mutual resistance.
Even so, and in spite of these drawbacks, the point to be emphasized again is
that at the level of government initiatives, the democratic regime has in fact
embarked on a program that attempts to erect the broad institutional foundations
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for labor incorporation in the process of democratic consolidation. It may be a
delayed promise, but it is also a seemingly sincere one.
Beyond economic and social areas of immediate labor concern, the government
has embarked on a program that is designed to increase investment levels in a
wide range of productive activities. Financed by 200 billion cruzados in public
funds that otherwise would have gone towards servicing the foreign debt, the
government hopes to thereby avoid a recession and revitalize those sectors where
there have been supply bottlenecks, including electric energy, smeltering and
steel mills, transportation, civil construction, ship-building, and agricul-
ture. The government has proposed to continue the recent trend which saw the
rate of investment rise from 17.3% of the Producto Bruto Interno (Gross Domestic
Product, or PBI) in 1985 to 19.6% in 1986, and which needs to rise to at least
21% by 1988 if a 7% real annual growth rate is to be achieved (but which
nonetheless is considerably less than the 25.4% average of the period 1974-
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1984). Since the 1987 figures indicate a strong possibility of decreases in
the overall (particularly private) rate of investment, the government has
launched an ambitious public investment scheme. This re-emphasis on public
investment not only attempts to defray the social costs of production, it also
intends to revitalize the dynamic components of the economy by restoring
domestic investor confidence and realigning private investment levels along with
the requirements of a real growth rate of 7%. Needless to say, this project
will have a decided impact on other economic concerns, particularly employment
and real wage levels. In this regard, however obliquely phrased in terms of
labor concerns strictly defined, it is clear that the government-promoted public
investment program constitutes a form of structural adjustment mechanism that
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underpins the other economic elements of its labor strategy.
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The third level of operation involved in the government's external approach
to organized labor is that of the administrative process/ i.e., the administra-
tive actions (or inaction) of the state in the labor relations field. Here the
government's orientation has been characterized by its deliberate inaction,
rather than by its actions. More specifically, it was decided that national
labor administration would deliberately refrain from exercising the full range
of prerogatives awarded it by the CLT. This came in the form of a policy
directive from the Labor Minister upon his assumption of office that ordered
that the MTb would henceforth not meddle in the internal affairs of unions, and
would generally refrain from using its powers of intervention when confronting
strikes. Instead it would direct its energies towards encouraging direct
negotiations between labor and capital. This orientation was evident during
the Dockworker's strike of March-April, 1987, when the MTb continued to encour-
age negotiations after the strike was declared illegal by the TST, something
that according to the CLT should have automatically entailed the intervention of
the Maritimp unions. Likewise, and possibly because of the MTb approach towards
the Dockworkers' strike, the TST delayed ruling on the legality of the March,
1987 petrochemical workers strike (despite it having occurred in an economic
activity deemed to be an essential service) long after the original expiration
date for such a ruling, and despite vociferous employer protests that the law be
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enforced. In addition, both agencies refrained from exercising their author-
ity during the week-long bank workers' strike in late March, 1987, which among
other things prevented strikers from being punished once the strike was settled.
In fact, all of these strikes were eventually settled via negotiations, often on
terms below the original labor demands (with the bank workers actually returning
to work without having gained any significant concessions from the banks, both
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public and private). Even so, this policy has been applied selectively in order
to discourage wildcat or system-wide strikes in essential areas. Thus a public
transportation strike in Sao Paulo was rapidly declared illegal in raid-April
1987 and subjected to prompt MTb intervention, whereupon it collapsed in two
days. A similar scenario occurred during the August 20, 1987 general strike,
where the government and employers combined selective intervention and repres-
sion (most often on the part of state governments) with economic incentives (in
the form of a 250 cruzado across-the-board wage increase decreed by the govern-
ment and employer-provided wage readjustments for cooperative unions on the eve
of the strike) in order to weaken its support--a tactic widely considered to
have been successful. The attitude of the MTb towards strikes can therefore be
characterized as one of gradual relaxation of legal restrictions and selective
(and relatively mild) enforcement of its external powers of intervention,
particularly with regard to economic strikes that are sectoral in nature.
The relaxation of national labor administration's enforcement authority has
nevertheless spawned a veritable wave of strikes. Official government statis-
tics show that in 1985 there were 843 strikes, followed by 1,493 in 1986 (a 77%
59increase), and 400 in the first three months of 1987. a confidential intelli-
gence report prepared for the president shows the figures to be even higher,
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with 1,289 strikes in 1985, and 2,282 strikes in 1986. However, the wave of
strikes does not overly concern the labor authorities. For one thing, they are
believed to serve as an "escape valve" for accumulated social tensions that if
6 1
otherwise unreleased could result in a social explosion. For another, they
are seen as an inevitable part of the (admittedly painful) process of sectoral
maturation that constitutes an essential element of the move towards democratic
consolidation. Weaned on a tradition of sectoral confrontation and state
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paternalism and interference, labor unions are now believed to be in the process
of discovering the value of non-confrontational strategies, albeit having first
resorted at length to the long-suppressed strike activities that are their
ultimate "weapon." Thus, the number of workdays lost in strikes actually fell
some 34% from 1985 to 1986, and almost 75% in the first two months of 1987 when
compared with the same period in 1986. Similarly, the average duration of
strikes decreased from 7.4 days in 1985 to 4.5 days in 1986, and was at 5.1 days
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through the first quarter of 1987. This leads the government to believe that
the labor maturation process is taking effect, and that strikes are getting both
shorter and taking on more of a sectoral nature due to the increased propensity
of union leaders to negotiate in order to receive concrete gains rather than
strike for symbolic purposes. Hence, after the decision to cancel interest
payments on the foreign debt was announced, the national labor movement was left
without one of the main reasons for calling a general strike. Not surprisingly,
the move for a national work stoppage was only ressurected after the plan to
eliminate the gatilho salarial was announced. Even so, as mentioned above, even
then adherence to the general strike called in August 1987 was far below the
expectations of its leaders.
According to Ricardo Bladino, president of the CGT, the reason for the
reluctance to call national strikes is because such strikes play into the hands
of international banks and the far right by destabilizing the government at a
time when it needs united domestic support. The CUT leadership, however, see
the situation quite differently. For the CUT, the decision to suspend interest
payments on the foreign debt is little more than a "populist game" on the part
of a government that lacks the courage to make the fundamentally political
64decision to suspend debt payments entirely. Hence, the underlying causes for
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the lack of national mobilization lie elsewhere. According to Jair Meneguelli,
president of the CUT, the moment for general strikes remains problematic because
"there exists an incapacity for mobilization. The rank and file are preoccupied
with their immediate needs and with the climate of recession and unemployment
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that grips the country, all of which contributes to demobilization." In other
words, the depth of the current economic crisis has forced the rank and file to
engage in daily survival strategies that work against support for symbolic,
overtly political, national strikes. Instead, the emerging pattern of strikes
suggests that the rank and file and national labor administration share a
perspective with regard to immediate concerns—employment stability and protect-
ing real wage levels—which in terms of labor strategy removes rank and file
motivations for general strikes that are more political referendums than
attempts at economic revindication. Apparently, neither the government or local'
unions are desirous of calling for such a referendum, given current economic
conditions. This was underscored by the refusal of the largest Sao Paulo
metalworkers union to join in the August, 1987 national strike, something which
not only contributed to the latter 's at best partial degree of success, but to
the further polarization of the labor movement as well (especially among those
unions affiliated with the CGT, to which the Sao Paulo Metalworkers Union
belonged, and which had supported the strike).
Whatever the motivations involved, the attitude adopted by national labor
administration towards strikes is congruent with a generalized belief in
Brazilian society that strikes are legitimate means of economic defense and
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revindication. This congruence with the rising tide of democratic sentiment
(or at least increased tolerance) within civil society—which may also explain




gives the MTb and its associated agencies the appear-
ance of being one of the "more democratic" and "pro-labor" branches of the state
apparatus (as opposed to the different military-related ministries and the
producer-oriented Ministerio de Fazenda) . As such, it is viewed by organized
labor as a potential toehold within the state that could help its quest for
incorporation in the process of substantive democratization at the institutional
level.
It is also possible that the government has deliberately refrained from
exercising the full range of powers accorded it by the CLT in order to sensitize
Brazilian capital to labor concerns. Under the authoritarian labor legislation,
organized labor was prevented from fully demonstrating its (potential) strength,
and employers were consequently insulated from many of the social realities that
enveloped the labor movement. This insulation became particularly acute after
the 1964 coup, when repression forcibly imposed a high degree of labor silence
on a broad range of issues. Hence, for a long time Brazilian capital has been
able to avoid addressing many substantive concerns of the working classes,
secure in the knowledge that any mobilization would encounter decisive govern-
ment opposition (often in the form of outright repression). However, as of
1974, the situation gradually began to change, and the present government may
well be using its lack of enforcement of the authoritarian labor codes as a
means of encouraging honest negotiating behavior among employers. It can
therefore be seen as a strategy that attempts to promote a form of conscience-
raising among Brazilian capitalists, something which in turn is designed to help
change traditional confrontational attitudes that run counter to the coopera-
tive, negotiated, and equitable relationship with labor that is deemed vital for
substantive democratic consolidation. Coupled with the previously-mentioned
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tripartite and bipartite initiatives and the proposed legal, economic and
political reforms/ this administrative approach constitutes part of the larger
effort to promote negotiated settlements as the foundations of a new democratic
labor relations system.
It should be remembered, though, that despite the variated and interlocked
nature of this three-pronged labor strategy, the success of the government's
external project vis-a-vis organized labor remains uncertain and subject to many
disruptions. For one thing, several important sectors in Brazilian society are
not as inclined to view labor incorporation in the political process in such a
favorable light. For these sectors, labor mobilization (for them evident in the
rising tide of strikes) is coterminous with rising crime rates, increases in
narcotics usage, vandalism, delinquency, moral and material corruption, and a
host of other social pathologies associated with the libertarianism they believe
inevitably emerges along with democracy in societies (such as Brazil) with a
politically "immature," "uneducated," or "uncultured" general population. This
view is held by influential sectors such as the armed forces hierarchy, con-
servative political groups of various stripes, and even the right wing of the
PMDB. For example, many business interests have gone on record to complain
about government permissiveness and indecision when confronting labor, especial-
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ly with regard to its attitude towards strikes. In addition to such criti-
cism, some of these sectors actively worked to subvert the Piano Cruzado and
even pressed extortative demands on labor during one of the worst moments of the
economic crisis: witness a February 1987 announcement by FIESP (the largest Sao
Paulo industrial association) that it would not negotiate its decision to
unilaterally impose a 48 hour minimum work week. Even if not successful in such
efforts, it is evident that these groups are actively trying to complicate the
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government's strategy in order to return to some serablence of the status quo
ante.
These sentiments find echo within the armed forces and certain sectors of
the government. Within the military hierarchy, recent labor mobilizations have
been seen as "scary" and "surprising" and are believed to reflect a "raodisrao de
68
greves" (strike fad) that is "revindicativa demais" (overly revindicative)
.
For this reason, the armed forces have seen fit to arbitrarily exercise their
authority in appropriate areas as a form of cautionary note to both the govern-
ment and labor. As a senior military officer is reported to have said, "If they
do not listen to the force of our arguments, then they will listen to the
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argument of our force." Thus, during the dockworkers strikes of March 1987,
and disregarding the non-interventory stance of the MTb, Navy Marines were sent
in to ensure safe operation of the ports, particularly the loading and unloading
of foreign vessels. Since ports come under the authority of a Naval Officer
(the Captain-General of the Port), and since shipping is considered to be an
essential service, the Navy felt well justified in unilaterally acting to ensure
continued operations in this area. Likewise, during the Petrochemical workers
strikes of the same period, Army troops were sent in to guard refineries and
other installations. Unlike the Navy Marines, Army troops did not perform the
tasks that otherwise would have fallen to the strikers. This pattern has been
repeated several times, such as in late September, 1987, when the Army sent
troops into the Itaipu dam complex on the Parana River in order to break up a
strike, with the ensuing clashes with workers resulting in several serious
injuries. In each case, justification for military intervention was given on
the grounds that it was a vital economic sector that could not be disrupted.
More importantly, none of these military interventions were foreseen, authori-
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zed, or condoned by the MTb or TST (or any other civilian-dominated branch of
government for that matter) , which points to the precarious nature of both the
government's position and its labor strategy during the current period of crisis
(to say nothing of the fluid internal balance of power between civilian and
military forces in government)
.
Similarly, conservative members of the PMDB and the PDS have blamed the
Labor Ministry, and Minister Pazzianotto specifically, for both the permissive
attitude towards labor and the failure of the initial attempt at reaching a
social pact. Some have even accused Pazzianotto (not entirely without reason)
of being more interested in cementing the foundations for a future run at the
governorship of Sao Paulo than in improving the national labor relations system.
Other branches of government, particularly the Ministerio de Fazenda, have also
been open in their disagreements with national labor authorities. All of this
has contributed to what some believe is the increased isolation of the Labor
Ministry from the rest of the executive branch, although the personal relation-
ship between Minister Pazzianotto and President Sarnay is considered to be
excellent (despite their well-known ideological differences). Ironically, this
may only point to the fact that both of them are becoming increasingly isolated
from the rest of their already seriously divided party, something which is
reflected in the different—when not opposing—attitudes adopted by rival PMDB
factions in Congress and by branches of the state apparatus controlled by
members of different PMDB currents.
On the other side, large sectors of the labor movement see the government's
"liberal" strategy as little more than a tactical diversion and procedural
vaneer that is designed to mask the continuing authoritarian components of the
labor relations system. Their preference for confrontation over cooperation,
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often couched in "extremist" (read Marxist) ideological terras, has further
undermined the government's program in the labor field. This has served to
harden the stance of the most anti-labor sectors of society, which perpetuates
the cycle of mutual distrust and zero-sum sectoral attitudes the government has
attempted to overcome. All of this augers poorly for the success of the new
labor policy, particularly given the constraints imposed on the government's
range of action by the economic crisis.
Such contratemps , internal contradictions, and contextual constraints
notwithstanding, what is ultimately important to consider is that, on an
external plane, labor policy has shifted significantly under the new democratic
regime. This has been evident on three interrelated levels of operation ranging
from abstract pronouncements in favor of a social pact to concrete proposals to
incorporate organized labor into decision-making bodies, and to programs that
are designed to democratize the national labor relations system, stimulate
domestic investment, preserve the real wage, increase employment levels, and
expand social security benefits to the least advantaged sectors of the popula-
tion. Labor Minister Pazzianotto summarized this new perspective as follows.
"On the part of the Federal government there were radical changes in pos-
ture. . .Besides the studies designed to modernize and democratize laws relating
to collective bargaining and strikes, the government of the Nova Republica has
not made use of old and actual legal provisions that allow it to repress work
stoppages and administratively intervene in labor organizations by removing or
firing elected union leaders. In effect, practices were abandoned that had been
habitual under previous governments, and today no Brazilian union leader feels
threatened by the Federal government when exercising his responsibilities."
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In effect, it is at the most basic levels of activity—freedom from
persecution when pursuing the right to free association and unfettered exercise
of sectoral expression—where the primary benefits of redemocratization have
been most immediately felt in the labor field. This is most specifically due to
the government's inaction in a range of labor-related areas that had previously
occupied a major part of the state's attention. Moreover, through these acts of
commission and omission, the government's labor strategy has attempted to extend
the benefits of redemocratization beyond the most basic levels and throughout
the labor relations system. In this fashion the government of the Nova Republi-
ca has moved to broaden the range of choice made available to organized labor
(at least when compared with past experience) while simultaneously encouraging
the adoption of a more select range—concertative participation, union democra-
tization, political expression through parties, and autonomous collective
bargaining—which it considers to be the institutional bases for democratic
class cooperation, if not compromise. The success at establishing such institu-
tional bases is considered to be an essential element in the overall process of
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substantive democratic consolidation.
In fact, without belaboring the point and recognizing that many parts of
the dominant political elite may have no interest in such a project, and that it
should ideally be achieved before the conquest of political power, it can be
argued that the external dimension of the government's labor strategy consti-
tutes a core element of a larger hegemonic project that is designed to cement
the foundations for the perpetuation of bourgeois democracy in Brazil. The
reasons for such a claim stem from the fact that "ruling groups do not maintain
their hegemony merely by giving their domination the aura of moral authority
through the creation and perpetuation of legitimating symbols; they must also
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seek to win the consent of subordinate groups to the existing social order."
Hence, according to Gramsci, hegemony requires of dominant groups that "account
be taken of the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to
be exercised, and that a certain balance or compromise be formed— in other
words, that the leading groups should make sacrifices of an economic-corporative
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kind." As a form of economic-corporative and political compromise based on a
specific mixture of ( superstructural) consent and concessions, the hegemonic
system of necessity has the state as its centerpiece, since "the State is the
entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling
class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the
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active consent of those over whom it rules. It is consequently through the
state that "the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general
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interests" of the subordinate groups." All of this points to the fact that "as
important as material conditions are as a basis for hegemony, political and
ideological conditions are even more important. The hegemonic system is
political in that it uses the state apparatus as its central organ. Political
class consciousness is the basic underpinning of the hegemonic system, and it
coexists with the corporate economic interest that propels the economic machine
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of the capitalist system."
Using national labor administration as the instrument of application, the
democratic government installed in 1985 has endeavored to make the economic,
corporate (legal), and political concessions that are designed to secure labor
consent to the perpetuation of democratic capitalism in Brazil. It should be
equally obvious that many obstacles remain before bourgeois hegemony is achieved
in Brazil. The point is that (whatever its ultimate success), after a long
period of authoritarian domination (dominio) in which organized labor was
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excluded from the political process and in which neither labor consent or
bourgeois concessions were granted, the advent of procedural democracy has
brought with it the possibility, however remote it may appear, of promoting a
hegemonic project oriented towards achieving a class compromise that would
strengthen the process of substantive democratic consolidation in that country.
More pertinent to the discussion here, it is only through the actions of the
state that such a project will be realized, something that appears to be evident
in the current thrust of the government's external labor strategy. With that in
mind, we can now turn to examine the "internal" facet of the new labor strategy,
something which is manifest in the structure, budget, and personnel employed in
national labor administration.
"IV. The Internal Face of Labor Administration, 1985-1987
A. Structure .
The responsibilities of the MTb and its dependent agencies are outlined in
Article 1 of decree 81,663/May 16, 1978. They include all issues related to
"organized labor, both syndical and professional, workplace health and safety
fiscalization, labor market factors, employment, wage, and immigration poli-
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cy." As mentioned earlier, there are no longer any provisions for social
security or welfare functions, which fall under the jurisdiction of the MS,
MPAS, INPS, and other related agencies. Hence, national labor administration is
formally charged with overseeing a relatively narrow range of more immediate
professional concerns connected with the labor market and employment context per
se . This is a far more restricted role than that envisioned under the original
design outlined by Vargas, and is a product of the structural and political
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Under this more restricted scheme, six functional areas are identified by
article 2 of decree 81,663/78, each having an organizational "cylinder" com-
prised of several horizontally-linked agencies that are vertically subordinated
to the office of the Minister. There are Orgaos de Asistencia Direta e Immedi-
ata Ao Ministro do Estado (Agencies of Direct and Immediate Assistance to the
Minister), which include the Minister's cabinet (Gabinete), Legal Counsel
(Consultoria Juridica or CJ), Security and Information Division (Divisao de
Seguranca e Informacoes or DSI), and Social Communications Coordinator (Coordi-
nadoria de Comunicapao Social or CCS); Orgaos Colegiados (Associated Agencies),
including the National Council on Wage Policy (Conselho Nacional de Politica
Salarial or CNPS), Federal Workforce Council (Conselho Federal de Mao-de-Obra or
CFMO), Superior Council for Maritime Labor (Conselho Superior do Trabalho
Marltimo or CSTM) , Labor Law Commission (Comissao de Direito do Trabalho or
CDT), National Council on Employment Policy (Conselho Nacional de Politica do
Emprego or CNPE), and Consultative Commission on Artisanal Labor (Comissao
Consultiva do Artesanato or CCA); Orgaos Centrais de Planejamento, Coordenacao,
e Controle Financeiro (Central Planning, Coordinating, and Financial Control
Agencies), including the Secretary-General (Secretaria-Geral or SG), and
Comptrolor ( Inspector ia Geral de Financas or IGF); Orgaos Centrais de Direcao
Superior (Centralized Direction Agencies), including the Workforce Secretariat
(Secretaria de Mao-de-Obra or SMO), Wage and Employment Secretariat (Secretaria
de Empregos e Salarios or SES), Labor Relations Secretariat (Secretaria de
Relacoes do Trabalho or SRT), Labor Medicine and Safety Secretariat (Secretaria
de Seguranca e Medicina do Trabalho or SSMT) , Social Promotion Secretariat
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(Secretaria de Promocao Social or SPS), Immigration Secretariat (Secretaria de
Immigracao of SIMIG), Personnel Department ( Departamento de Pessoal or DP), and
Administrative Department (Departamento de Administracao or DA); Orgaos Region-
ais (Regional Agencies), including Regional Labor Delegations (Delegacias
Regionais do Trabalho or DRT's) and Maritime Labor Delegations (Delegacias do
Trabalho Marltimo or DTM's); and finally, Orgaos Autonomos (Autonomous Agencies)
such as the Special Fellowship Service (Servico Especial de Bolsas de Estudo)
,
and National Rural Labor Training Service (Servico Nacional de Formacao Profis-
sional Rural) . Several other agencies are also directly linked to the Mini-
ster's office: the National Industrial Training Service (Servico Nacional de
Aprendizagem Industrial or SENAI), National Commercial Training Service (Servico
Social da Industria or SESI), Commercial Social Service (Servico Social do
Comercio or SESC), and the Jorge Duprat Figueiredo Foundation for Labor Medicine
and Safety ( Fundacao Jorge Duprat Figueiredo de Seguranca e Medicina do Trabalho
or FUNDACENTRO)
.
Within this organizational framework there exists a clear division between
internal support and administrative functions (known as atividades meios ) and
external control, coordination, and oversight activities ( atividades fims )
.
Internal functions are directed by the Secretary-General, who also serves as the
Acting Minister when the incumbent is not in residence. The Administrative
Department handles internal logistical-management responsibilities, and is
linked to the federal Sistema de Servicos Gerais (General Services System) . The
Personnel Department is responsible for all personnel matters (recruitment,
promotion and dismissal schedules, merit increases, etc.), and is connected to
the Sistema de Pessoal Civil da Administracao Central (Civil Service System of
the Central Administration). Before its elimination, the Comptrolor's office
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handled all budgetary and accounting duties, which have since been separated and
dispersed among other agencies.
It is apparent that despite its more restricted scope of concerns, there
has been a diversification, organizational decentralization, and hierarchical
compartmentalization of functional tasks within Brazilian labor administration
since 1978- This again reflects the increased range of labor concerns now being
technically defined, as well as the recognition that these concerns have to be
institutionally addressed by the state as part of the process of democratic
transition.
The external responsibilities of the MTb have been functionally compartmen-
talized and subdivided into overlapping formulation and implementory categories.
The formulation responsibilities are divided among the various Orgaos Colegiados
and the Secretarias of the implementory branches in areas directly related to
them. Each Secretaria is the lead agency of an implementory branch. With
regards to professional training programs, the CFMO and CCA draw up policies
which are implemented by the SMO; wage, labor market, and employment policies
are formulated in the CNPS and CNPE, then implemented by the SES; labor legisla-
tion interpretation and reform (including issues involving union recognition,
collective bargaining, etc.) is carried out and formulated by the CDT and
enforced by the SRT. It should be noted that there is no formal or direct link
between the formulative and implementory spheres, since the Minister (using
inputs from both sides) mediates between them and has ultimate decision-making
authority. There also exist many areas of overlap where two or more agencies
are involved at both levels, or in which upper-echelon personnel occupy posi-
tions in both formulative and implementory agencies. Even so, it is evident
that a hierarchical division of labor exists between policy-formulation and
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policy-implementation agencies encompassed within the external, atividade fim
functional area.
In terms of specific implementation responsibilities/ the SMO handles all
federal job training programs; the SES constitutes the center of the Sistema
Nacional de Emprego (National Employment System) , and has a major role in
determining incomes policy (since it is the agency charged with primary re-
sponsibilities for determining when wage adjustments should be implemented) ; the
SSMT is charged with all matters related to labor medicine, safety, and hygiene,
and therefore has major inspection and control responsibilities; the SPS
oversees syndical social promotion activities (i.e. educational, cultural, and
recreational facilities, etc.); and the SIMIG is responsible for labor-related
matters connected with immigration and migration. The SRT has the primary tasks
of union registration and recognition, collective bargaining, mediation,
arbitration, electoral and financial oversight, and in conjunction with the SSMT
through the Delegacias Regionais, workplace inspection. As a result, it is the
main institutional referent for organized labor's professional concerns, and
thus is a major instrument in the structuring of working class interests in
Brazil. As such, the SRT is the "first among equals" in the external functional
area, in a down-scaled version of the centralized structure inherited from the
Estado Novo .
With regard to hierarchical structure, each Secretaria in the external
branches has an Asesoria (Adivory Office), 2-4 Subsecretarias (Assistant
Secretaries) , several functionally-defined department- level Coordenadoras in
specific project areas, plus auxiliary services. In total, there are 7 hier-
archical levels: Minister, Advisory Agencies, Secretariats and Secretary-
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General, Assistant Secretary (in the external branches) and Secretaries (in the
internal branches), Coordenadoras or Departments, Divisions, and Sections.
The advent of the democratic regime has not substantially altered the
formal structure of the MTb. Within the internal branches charged with ativida-
desmeios, Secretarias-Geral Adjuntas (Adjunct Secretary-Generals) were created
in the areas of Asuntos Tecnico-Financeros (Technical-Financial Affairs) and
Asuntos Juridico-Administrativos (Legal-Administrative Affairs) . The former
occupies the place of the IGF, and oversees two Secretariats, Orcamento e
Financas (Budget and Finance) and Planejamento (Planning), which have specific
planning and budgetary control responsibilities. The latter oversees a Secre-
taria de Modernisacao Administrativa (Administrative Modernization Secretariat)
charged with administrative reform and planning, a Secretaria de Orgaos Region-
ais e Colegiados (Secretariat of Regional and Associated Agencies) which
supervises the autonomous and associated agencies, and a Secretaria de Estudos
Especiais (Special Studies Secretariat) , which is charged with special studies
of both an external (policy) and internal (administrative-organizational)
nature. Most importantly, it is through the Secretaria de Orgaos Regionais e
Colegiais that the Secretaria-Geral Adjunta de Asuntos Juridico-Administrativos
is responsible for financing the DRT's and most of the labor inspection agencies
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formally under the jurisdiction of the SRT and SSMT. In this way there is
independent internal control over financial disbursements in a critical external
area. In order to improve auditing and fiscal procedures, a Secretaria de
Controle Interno (Internal Control Secretariat) was also created. Coupled with
the continued presence of the DP and DA, this suggests that internal management
decentralization and compartmentalization has brought with it considerable
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overlapping of responsibilities (in an internal variant of the "bureaucratic
rings" Cardoso has mentioned with reference to the Brazilian state en toto )
.
The external cylinders, including the Orgaos Colegiados , Centrais de
Direcao Superior , Regional
s
, and Autonomos , have not suffered any significant
structural modifications under the democratic regime. Instead, the impact of
regime change has been most strongly felt at the level of internal emphasis.
As mentioned before, there has been a deliberate internal reorientation of
the MTb's mission which has shifted administrative concern towards responsibili-
ties emphasizing negotiations and conciliatory functions over interventory
powers. Coupled with the other political, economic, and legal reforms promoted
by the government, this has given the SRT the most visible external role within
national labor administration, and has thus made it the "major focus" of the new
80labor relations network. This combination of internal and external reforms
has in turn generated a host of external demands
—
particularly requests for
arbitration, mediation, and legal competence—that fall within the purview of
the SRT. In effect, there has been a series of mutually reinforcing internal
and external pressures that emerged as part of the redemocratization process
which have pushed the SRT to a position of prominence that belies the lack of
structural modifications or its relatively weak bureaucratic presence within the
MTb hierarchy. This enhanced role is in many respects just an organizational
reflection of the renewed status of national labor administration as a whole
within the state apparatus. As a result, some Labor Ministry officials believe
that the MTb has moved from a second-rate portfolio under the military regime to
8
1
that of a first-rate cabinet post in the Nova Republica .
Other external areas have also received new emphasis, especially the SES
and the SSMT. In all of its phases, the Piano Cruzado requires the active
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participation of the MTb in determining wage rates, adjustment schedules,
inflation indexes, and employment levels, all of which has raised the SES to a
previously unknown position of institutional prominence (both within and without
the MTb) . Similarly, the increased emphasis awarded the technical responsibili-
ties of the fiscais do trabalho (labor inspectors) has reaffirmed the primacy of
both the SRT and SSMT, which jointly oversee the workplace inspection activities
through the DRT's. Hence, while the external branches continue to display the
hierarchical structure deliniated by decree 81,633/78, they have undergone a
considerable shift in emphasis as a result of the new government's democratic
labor strategy. In this case, organizational decentralization of functional
tasks offers a technically
—
justified complement to the quest for procedural
neutrality and state autonomy in the labor relations field- This new organiza-
tional orientation can therefore be seen as the internal complement to the
government's external initiatives in this policy area.
Finally, there is one agency whose diminished role must be identified and
explained. The Divisao de Seguranca e Informacoes (DSI) is formally defined as
an agency of Asistencia Direita e Imediata ao Ministro de Estado (i.e. of Direct
and Immediate Assistance to the Minister). However, it is in fact a branch of
the Servico Nacional de Informapoes (National Information Service or SNI), the
military-operated national intelligence service. Its responsibilities--which
remain ill-defined and therefore difficult to completely ascertain--are oriented
towards monitoring strike activity, identifying and cataloguing "subversive"
elements and otherwise suspect or dangerous individuals and activities within
the union movement, keeping tabs on the MTb's activities and relations with
unions, and generally appraising the SNI of ongoing developments in the labor
relations field. In this capacity it is a data collection branch of the
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national intelligence service, one with a very specific mission that goes far
beyond the elaboration of labor-related statistics. As such, it is not so much
responsible to the Labor Minister as it is to the armed forces and the SNI. For
example, the previously mentioned confidential report on strike activity
prepared by the SNI for the president is believed to have originated in the DSI=
The fact that the data on strike activity presented in its report differed
significantly from the official figures issued by the Labor Ministry underscores
its independence from ministerial control. Its continued presence after 1985
can therefore be seen as evidence of an enduring military interest in labor
relations on security-oriented grounds, which points to the continued prevalence
within the armed forces of "organic" notions of internal security based on the
Doctrine of National Security originally elaborated some 25 years ago, and which
run counter to the logic of labor incorporation that underpins the approach of
the democratically elected civilian authorities. As such, the DSI represents
one more enduring authoritarian legacy that has yet to be erradicated from
Brazilian institutional life. Even so, relative to the previous regime, the
activities of the DSI have been severely curtailed by the new labor authorities,
and it is virtually—and very consciously—ignored by the ministerial hierarchy.
Again, this de-emphasis stands in marked contrast to the active role that the
DSI played in the MTb during the previous regime, which offers additional proof




The MTb, as an agency without responsibilities for furnishing public goods
other than its technical expertise and inspection services, has consistently
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received a small percentage of the central administrative budget, on average
ranking penultimate among all ministeries in monies received. Since 1985, the
MTb budget has on average amounted to 0.3% of the total Federal budget, and 6%
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of the central administrative budget. Of this, personnel expenses (salaries,
severance, leave pay, etc.) constitute the largest budgetary category, having
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risen from 43% in 1984 to 63.4% in 1987. The second largest budgetary
category within national labor administration corresponds to logistical and
infrastructural expenditures (including those related to workplace inspection
85functions), which ranged from 57% of the MTb budget in 1984 to 36.6% in 1987.
The shift in non-personnel outlays is interesting. Prior to 1986 the bulk of
non-personnel expenditures were directed towards internal agencies with support
and management responsibilities, most often for supplies, furnishings, and the
like. However, since 1984 there has been a progressive redistribution of non-
personnel outlays within the MTb that corresponds to its shift in external
orientation. Internal expenditures unrelated to personnel outlays fell from
54.2% in 1984 to 39.7% in 1987 of the total spent on non-personnel categories,
while external non-personnel outlays rose from 33.3% in 1984 to 50.2% in 1987.
This suggests that the changed external emphasis of national labor administra-
tion has prompted a corresponding shift in budgetary priorities, with a large
amount of financial resources now directed towards providing a better level of
service at the external level. Hence, the vast majority of these increases have
occurred in programs such as the Servico Nacional de Emprego (National Employ-
ment Service) operated by the SES , the Coordinadora de Fiscalisacao e Normali-
zacao do Trabalho (Labor Inspection and Normalization Coordinator) operated by
SRT, the Programe de Preparacao de Mao-de-Obra (Occupational Training Program)
supervised by the SMO, and the Programa de Sequranga e Medicina do Trabalho
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(Labor Medicine and Safety Program) operated by the SSMT, as well as syndical
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support programs managed by the SEPS. In effect, the shift in non-personnel
outlays corresponds to the increased emphasis placed on improving the range of
external professional services offered by national labor administration to its
major "client."
In terms of personnel outlays, the budgetary distribution remains heavily
weighed in favor of the internal branches, since it is there where most of the
MTb personnel are employed. With regards to the external branches, most of the
personnel outlays are directed towards the regional delegations (which are most
directly involved in providing the services mentioned above) , rather than
towards those employed in the sede central in Brasilia.
One very significant change has occurred with regard to the imposto
sindical . Prior to 1986, and whatever its original intentions, the 20% of the
union tax designated for the state generally ended up being used for internal
administrative expenditures within national labor administration. In fact, in
1984 41.2% of said expenditures were financed by the imposto sindical, and in
881985 this figure rose to 45.98%. In general, half of the MTb's expenditures
on non-personnel accounts has traditionally come from the imposto sindical .
However, with the creation of the Seguro Desemprego (as part of the Piano
Cruzado) , as of 1987 the entire state share of the imposto sindical was desig-
nated for that fund. Anticipating these reductions, in 1986 the amount of non-
personnel outlays derived from the imposto sindical fell to 21.4%, and as
89foreseen, in 1987 this figure was reduced to zero. In parallel, the Cuesteio
do Seguro Desemprego (Unemployment Insurance Fund) rose from 376.6 million
90Cruzados in 1986 to 5,800 million in 1957, an increase of 1,400%.
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What is most interesting to note is that elimination of imposto sindical
financing of MTb non-personnel accounts has generated serious disagreements over
its impact on the autonomy of national labor administration. One line of
thought holds that the transfer of funds derived from the imposto sindical to
the Seguro Desemprego has diminished the material need for those outlays within
the MTb and associated agencies, thereby increasing labor administration's
91formulative and operative autonomy relative to the unions. Another line of
thought takes just the opposite view, arguing that the elimination of the
imposto sindical contribution to non-personnel outlays makes national labor
administration more dependent on other branches of the state (especially the
Ministerio de Fazenda and Congress) for the money it otherwise would receive
through the imposto sindical . Since outlays remain relatively constant despite
the climate of fiscal crisis, this has forced MTb officials to go "com o chapeu
na mao" (with hat in hand) to ask Congress and Fazenda for additional funds to
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make up the difference. Thus, while it may be politically expedient to have
transferred the imposto sindical contribution to a highly visible public good,
and while it may contribute to the formulative autonomy of the MTb vis-a-vis
organized labor, this argument holds that it has also been managerially inexped-
ient, since it diminishes the operative autonomy of national administration
relative to other branches of the state. Since Brazilian labor administration
has always enjoyed a relatively high level of autonomy with respect to the
working classes, this argument seems to be particularly pertinent here. In any
event, what it has done in a positive vein is remove the vested financial
interest that labor administration traditionally had in seeing that labor
remained unorganized in a variety of productive areas. For this reason, it is a
significant step on the road towards democratic consolidation.
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With regard to the manner in which resources are distributed within
national labor administration, the procedure is as follows. On the Minister's
and Secretary-General's recommendations, the Budget and Finance Secretariat
formulates an annual budget based upon figures supplied by lead agencies in each
functional sub-field (Secretariats and Departments), which is then submitted to
the president. The president revises the budget proposal after discussion in
cabinet meetings and with the advice of the Ministerio de Fazenda. It is then
returned to the MTb for final review and, if needed, revision. Once the draft
budget proposal is approved by the Executive Branch, it is sent to Congress,
where it undergoes revisions deemed necessary by both houses. These revisions
are the product of much debate and negotiation at the committee level before
they reach the full House and Senate for final votes. Once the budget is
approved by Congress, it is distributed within the MTb and associated agencies
according to a revised schedule maintained by the Budget and Finance Secretari-
at. Part of the MTb budget is administered by the Secretary-General through the
Adjunct Secretary-General for Legal-Administrative Affairs (especially that
which is destined for external branch financing) . All other disbursements are
administered by the Internal Control Secretariat, which answers directly to the
minister and which carries out comptroller, accounting, and related fiscal
control activities through several specialized agencies. What there is, in
effect, is a relatively centralized process of budgetary formulation, and a
relatively decentralized process of budget distribution, in which the main
agencies involved in the former do not carry out primary obligations in the
latter. This division of labor is designed to more equitably and objectively
administer the flow of resources within national labor administration, thereby
diminishing the possibility of arbitrary or discretionary criteria intruding
upon the distribution process.
60
C. Personnel .
As of late 1986 there were 12,700 employees engaged in centralized agencies
of national labor administration (MTb sede central and TST) , a reduction of 300
relative to the amount employed at the onset of the democratic regime in April,
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1985. To this can be added the 8,758 agents employed in the DRT's. With a
total' of 21,458 employees, Brazilian labor administration (as one might expect
from a country with its size and demographics) is the largest such state agency
in South America. Even so, this figure represents just a tiny fraction (0.01%)
of the total number of agents employed by centralized agencies of the federal
government. In this sense, the MTb derives its cabinet status from its strate-
gic location in an area of political activity that is a "core" functional
concern of the state (as does other relatively small cabinet level agencies such
as Intamaraty, the Foreign Ministry) , rather than from the human and material
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resources it commands. That is to say, it is the nature of its "core"
functional task, as opposed to the range of public goods that it provides and
resources that it controls, that award national labor administration equal rank
with far larger branches of the state apparatus.
A large number of those formally assigned to centralized agencies of the
MTb are in fact attached to various orgaos vinculados . Most of these are found
in the Servico Nacional de Formacao Profissional Rural (National Rural Profes-
sional Training Service or SENAR) , which has 1,756 employees. The majority of
employees, however, are engaged in administrative and support functions encom-
passed within the internal, actividade meio areas. This includes 9,363 agents
assigned to agencies subordinate to the Budget and Finances Secretariat (70% of
the total employed in centralized agencies), 471 assigned to the Administrative
Department (4.1%), 435 attached to the Secretary-General (3.4%), and 267
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employed in the Personnel Department (1.6%). The Minister's cabinet, which has
a dual role (albeit with a heavy external orientation at the moment), employs
253 agents, or 1.9% of the MTb total. As for the external branches, the
breakdown of personnel figures includes 84 attached to the SRT (0.8%), followed
by 74 in the SSMT (0.6%), 66 in the SES (0.5%), 60 in the SEPS (0.4%), 53 in the
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SIMIG (0.3%), and 45 in the SMO (0.2%). From this picture it is clear that
the vast majority of those employed in centralized agencies of the MTb discharge
functions within branches responsible for financial and personnel matters. By
inference, it is also apparent that those employed in the external branches,
although a numerical minority, disproportionally represent the more specialized
personnel categories in national labor administration. This is especially true
if we factor in the DRT's, as we shall see below.
The largest personnel category in national labor administration is that of
administrative agents (clerks, secretaries, etc.) followed by accountants,
security, and other service staff. The majority of these positions are located
in agencies responsible for administrative and other internal functional tasks.
The external branches also contain large numbers of administrative agents, but
here the percentages are more equitably distributed with personnel with higher
levels of specialization such as sociologists, economists, lawyers, managers,
and the most uniquely qualified of all, "syndical assistants" (whose precise
qualifications and functions I must confess to be unable to adequately explain).
This distribution, with its emphasis on specialized skills, is even more
pronounced in the DRT's, where the largest personnel category is that of labor
inspectors ( fiscais do trabalho ), followed by administrative staff, medical
97doctors, engineers, and the ubiquitous syndical assistants. For example, in
the largest regional labor delegation, that of the state of Sao Paulo (which
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along with the DRT's in Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul
comprise DRT Group 1, the biggest and most important regional delegation), there
are 904 inspectors, 66 engineers, and 44 medical doctors out of a total staff of
1,700. Together, this staff is responsible for monitoring 470,000 firms and 6
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million workers. This points to the fact that, the government's best inten-
tions notwithstanding, Brazilian labor administration has considerable room for
improving the range and scope of its services.
From this outline we can see that the external responsibilities of national
labor administration, both centralized and decentralized, require a relative
high percentage of specialized personnel, even if the total number of agents
engaged in such tasks is not the largest portion of those employed throughout
the labor administration system. Given the nature of the tasks in question
—
workplace inspection, occupational health and safety, labor market analysis,
wage rate determination, labor legislation reform, etc.—this should not be
entirely surprising, even when factoring the somewhat nebulous specializations
of the syndical assistants. Like most organizations with a specialized func-
tion, there is a large body of support personnel working on behalf of the more
specialized personnel who discharge labor administration's most important tasks.
As a curious sidelight, it is worth noting that of the 29 employees working
in the DSI, 5 are classified as information analysts and 1 is classified in the
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unique category of National Security Mobilization Analyst. It is also worth
mentioning that in the DSI and elsewhere, employment levels have dropped
markedly after a hiring freeze was imposed on the federal bureaucracy by the
original Piano Cruzado. As mentioned before, this has reduced the total number
of employees both relative to the military regime (despite the expanded scope of
external activities), and relative to estimated maximum efficiency size require-
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nxents. In this regard, national labor administration has been one of the few
areas of the state apparatus in which there has been a deliberate attempt to
implement a hiring freeze according to the Piano Cruzado's guidelines.
The sex distribution of Brazilian labor administration shows a familiar
patriarchical pattern, whereby the majority of employees are women engaged in
middle and lower echelon internal management ( actividade meio ) positions, while
the minority of male employees are disproportionately represented in higher-
echelon and more specialized positions in external branches. Even so, some
advances have been made under the democratic regime. One of the Secretariats,
the SES, is headed by a woman, several of the Minister's main advisors are
female, and a handful of women occupy positions as heads of divisions, etc.
However unintentionally, this may be evidence of a (sexual) democratizing trend
within national labor administration. If so, it is a small yet significant
microcosmic step towards substantive institutional democratic consolidation.
With the advent of the democratic regime, the entire decision-making cadre
in the MTb (down to the department level), the so-called "confidence" or
"political positions," was replaced. The current leadership is occupied by a
mixture of PMDB adherents and specialists in labor relations, with a pronounced
tendency towards backgrounds in labor-management issues and politics in the
state of Sao Paulo. Many of these individuals are associated with the most
progressive wing of the PMDB, which underscores the role it plays within the
state apparatus. The Minister of Labor, Almir Pazzianotto, is a native of Sao
Paulo who previously served as a labor lawyer representing metalurgical workers
in the ABC region. The Secretary of Labor Relations, Plinio Sarti, also served
as a labor lawyer, in his case representing Metalworkers in the Ribera Preto
district of Sao Paulo.
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The remaining external branches are headed by similarly qualified person-
nel. The Secretary of Employment and Wages is a professional economist with a
long career in public service; the Secretary of Workforce Affairs is a univer-
sity professor with experience in vocational training; the Secretary of Immigra-
tion is a career public servant; the Secretary of Labor Medicine and Safety is a
medical doctor; and the Secretary of Social Promotion is a labor lawyer. In
addition, the head of the SENAR is an agricultural engineer, while the Secre-
tary-General previously served as president of the Sao Paulo banker's union and
as Vice President of DIEESE (a not inconsequential background for the substitute
(i.e. vice) minister). In one way or another, all of these individuals had
prior records of professional involvement in labor issues in the state of Sao
Paulo, a characteristic that extends throughout the Minister's cabinet, advisory
agencies, and certain lower-echelon positions such as the syndical assist-
ants. This infusion of paulistas with PMDB affiliation and/or expertise in
labor affairs continues a long-standing historical trend in which Brazilian
Labor Ministers have staffed "political positions" and cargos de confianca with
long-term professional acquaintences , fellow party members, and even friends and
relatives. While seemingly parochial and ascriptive, it is argued that in the
current context this ensures a coherent and professional ministerial mind-set
that promotes concerted and efficient policy formation and implementation.
Whether this is true or not, it is clear that it has encouraged a very definite
pro-democratic orientation within the current leadership cadre. In addition, it
has helped reduce upper-echelon personnel turnover in a critical and highly
visible area of state activity, something which offers a (perhaps illusionary)
appearance of political stability.
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What is important to consider is that the government's "liberal" orienta-
tion towards negotiation and cooperation with organized labor is reflected in
the appointment of upper-echelon personnel in the MTb and other agencies
involved in national labor administration. Their previous backgrounds and
experience are considered to be the first steps in establishing a bridge between
the labor movement and the state, something upon which the other elements of the
government's labor strategy have subsequently been constructed. Practical
expertise, a "progressive" or "liberal" approach, and labor-related backgrounds
are consequently the main characteristics among upper-echelon personnel in
national labor administration under the Sarnay government, and are what allow
the MTb hierarchy to see themselves as both procedurally neutral and yet
internal "defenders" of labor interests within the state apparatus. This has
allowed them to exercise a fairly significant level of formulative autonomy with
regard to labor policy, although as we have seen, their operative autonomy
remains subject to a number of constraints.
V. Conclusion .
It should be apparent that at both the external and internal levels, the
tenor if not tone of Brazilian labor administration has evolved considerably
since the advent of the Nova Republica. Building on organizational changes that
were themselves a reflection of the profound structural transformations at play
within the Brazilian labor market and syndical movement as of 1978, the altered
character of national labor administration has been most visibly manifest in its
external orientation and strategy towards the labor-capital relationship. This
change has taken shape on three interrelated levels of operation: attempts at
establishing a concertative dialogue that could possibly culminate—however
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narrowly-defined and contingent it may be—in a social pact involving labor,
capital, and the executive branch; attempts at promoting legal, political, and
economic reforms that provide substantive institutional bases for labor incor-
poration into the process of democratic consolidation; and in administrative
acts of commission and (more importantly) omission that are designed to rein-
force in all actors' minds the changed nature of labor administration and labor
relations under democracy. All of this may well be part of a larger hegemonic
project that is designed to establish the consensual foundations for the
achievement of class compromise and the eventual consolidation of democratic
capitalism in Brazil.
At an internal level, this change was less obviously manifest in organiza-
tional reforms, although a move towards functional compartmentalization and
formulative-implementory decentralization is evident, especially in the internal
actividade meio branches. With regard to external functions, labor relations,
occupational safety, and wage and employment policy are emphasized, while social
promotion and welfare activities are subordinated to the programs offered by
other branches of the state apparatus such as the MPAS, MS, and INPS. Technical
emphasis on labor issues more strictly defined has been reinforced by budgetary
redistributions which support the MTb's external mission, and which reduce its
dependence on the imposto sindical for internal administrative expenses. It is
also evident in a personnel selection process that emphasizes professional
backgrounds in labor relations (most often on the labor side) in the country's
most populous and industrialized state (in yet another indirect manifestation of
the dominant characteristics of the national economy, as had been the creation
of the Labor Department in 1918 as an agency of the Agriculture Ministry)
.
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It is in this fashion that national labor administration has become the
closest thing to an institutional mediator between labor and capital (and even
between labor and other branches of the state) that Brazil has seen. Buttressed
by personal backgrounds, budgetary emphasis on technical and legal responsibili-
ties, and procedural neutrality in conflict negotiations, the MTb and associated
agencies serve as a dual filter for sectoral interests. On one side (or perhaps
better seen as from the top-fown) , national labor administration filters the
expectations and demands of the executive branch and capitalist organizations
and presents them for review to the organized labor movement. This paralells,
and is often designed to soften the tone of direct interaction between labor,
capital, and other branches of the state. On the other hand (or from the
bottom-up, as it were), labor administration gathers and filters the expecta-
tions and demands of the organized working classes and presents them to the rest
of the executive branch and capitalist collective agents. The locus in which
the two perspectives converge is constituted by the internal debate within the
executive branch between agencies that respond to capitalist interests (such as
Ministeries of Fazenda, Agriculture, Industry, the Central Bank, etc.), and the
one that answers for the labor movement (buttressed by the input provided by
other agencies with direct functional ties to subordinate groups such as the
MPAS, MS, and INPS). Obviously, the dynamics of the debate rest on conjunctural
factors at the macro, meso, and micro economic levels, and the responses they
generate within different social sectors, as well as on the more normative
concerns with fairness, equality, and the move towards substantive democratiza-
tion. It is important to point out, however, that in this regard the role of
the state in general, and national labor administration in particular, has
changed markedly relative to the pre-1985 period. Hence, although the process
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has been slow, incremental, and not without pitfalls, and even if its future
remains uncertain, the evolution away from the long standing Brazilian tradition
of exclusionary state corporatist administration of organized labor interests
appears to have gradually begun to take concrete shape, and if ill-defined and
fragile in its present state of gestation, nevertheless broaches the possibility
of a cooperative, if not inclusionary labor relations system in the future. If
such were to occur, it would be proof that even in Brazil "as coisas podem
mudar," in this case for the better.
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ENDNOTES
Procedural (formal) democracy refers to an instrumental and legalistic
view that emphasizes formal party competition and open, competitive elections as
the hallmarks of democratic political systems. Substantive democracy refers to
the three levels involved in reproducing democratic structures, values, and
relationships throughout a polity. At an institutional level, it is reflected
in the general organization and specific structure and functions of the state




political parties (which may or may not have a class basis),
and in the organization and behavior of the collective agents that emerge to
defend and represent the interests of a variety of social groups. At a societal
level, substantive democratization involves the inculcation throughout society
of basic notions of consent, compromise, concession, collective interest,
solidarity, and legitimate exchange. This promotes a high degree of participa-
tion, social tolerance, and adherence to the ethical and procedural norms and
representative institutional channels that constitute the basic rules and
framework of the democratic political "game." Finally, at an economic level
(which is usually the most difficult to define and achieve) , substantive
democracy involves a general agreement within society which favors political
guarantees for the maintenance of minimum living standards that provide for
basic physical and social needs, as well as ensure just recompensation for
individual productive activity (for example, through welfare legislation and
minimum wage standards). The degree to which a society has moved towards the
full achievement of procedural and substantive democracy at all of its levels
helps us distinguish between inclusionary, exclusionary, limited, liberal,
progressive, and radical democratic systems.
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